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Introduction
The cognitive science of science has largely concentrated on the nature of the concepts, theories, and explanations that scientists develop and students learn. There has been a general neglect of the values that are also part of scientific practice. The development of science has depended on valuing observations, experiments, and objectivity in the assessment of scientific hypotheses. The adoption of these values was a crucial part of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment of the 16 th through 18 th centuries, and the values have remained important in the current practice of science.
Today, however, they are challenged from various directions, ranging from the religious right who prefer faith over evidence, to the postmodernist left who decline to "privilege" science and rationality over obscurity and irony.
Whereas the role of values has largely been neglected in psychological and computational studies of science, philosophers of science have become increasingly concerned with issues about values (e.g. Douglas 2009 , Lacey 1999 , Longino 1990 ). The major debate concerns whether there should be a role for social and ethical values in the assessment of scientific theories. The traditional view is that science should be "value free", which means that it is restricted to epistemic values such as evidence and truth,
ignoring social values that might lead to biases in scientific research. A common worry is that allowing an incursion of social values into science will produce corruptions like those witnessed frequently in the history of science, for example the racist distortions in Nazi science and the sexist distortions in nineteenth century neuroscience. In response, philosophers such as Douglas (2009) argue that values inescapably and legitimately play a role in scientific deliberations, and the key to improving science is to make application of these values rationally appropriate as opposed to irrationally biased.
This chapter explores what cognitive science can contribute to this normative enterprise of finding an appropriate place for values in science by addressing questions that are largely ignored in philosophical discussions: Consider, for example, the value truth. On the ideal structure view, truth is an abstract concept that exists independently of human minds, and the value attached to it is an abstract relation between a person (also an ideal entity) and the abstract concept.
Philosophers often write of propositional attitudes which are supposed to be relations between two kinds of abstract entities: persons and propositions, which are the meanings of sentences. Analogously, the ideal structure view of values can understand them as "conceptual attitudes", that is, relations between persons and the abstract meanings of concepts.
In contrast, the social construction understanding of truth views it as a way of talking that emerges from interactions among people. Shapin (1994) writes of the "social history of truth", taking truth to be a product of collective action rather than correspondence to reality. From this perspective, truth and other scientific values are just preferences that people happen to have as the result of their social circumstances.
Cognitive science offers an alternative to ideal structure and social construction accounts of the nature of values. As chapter 1 described, the standard assumption in cognitive science is that inferences such as decisions result from mental representations and processes. A mental representation is a structure or process in the mind that stands for something. Typical examples are concepts which stand for classes of things, propositions which stand for states of affairs, and rules which stand for regularities in the world. In contrast to the ideal structure position, concepts and other mental representations are not abstract entities, but rather parts of the world as brain processes in individual humans (Thagard 2010a) . As chapter 18 argues, the structure of a concept can be highly complex, with pointers to visual and emotional information. The following conventions are used in these maps. Elements (mental representations) are depicted by shapes:
• Ovals represent emotionally positive (pleasurable) elements.
• Hexagons represent emotionally negative (painful) elements.
• Rectangles represent elements that are neutral or carry both positive and negative aspects.
Straight lines depict relations between elements:
• Solid lines represent the relations between elements that are mutually supportive.
• Other values not displayed include simplicity and analogy, both of which are part of my theory of explanatory coherence which I take to be the main route to truth and objectivity (ch. 5, 7). The structure in figure 17.2 is not just an abstract diagram, but also represents a neural network of the HOTCO sort (ch. 5) that can be used as a computational model of why scientists make the decisions that they do.
For example, if religious people advocate ignoring the lack of solid evidence for a miraculous event, then the structure displayed in figure 17.2 will reject their claims, because of the positive value attached to evidence and the negative value attached to faith. Not every scientist or philosopher has the set of values shown in figure 17.2, but I view this group as defensible for reasons set out in many publications (e.g. Thagard 1988 Thagard , 1992 Thagard , 1999 Thagard , 2000 . Others might choose to emphasize other values such as prediction, To take examples from cognitive science, we can distinguish between basic research about fundamental psychological and neural processes, on the one hand, and applied research aimed at improving practices in education, mental health, and other areas relevant to human wellbeing. If the view I have been developing is correct, then decisions about the pursuit and application of science are multifactorial, involving consideration of the extent to which different projects promote the satisfaction of a full range of epistemic, social, and personal values. Descriptively and normatively, the process of decision is not reducible to some straightforward algorithm such as maximizing expected utility, but requires rather a complex process of constraint satisfaction that can include revising goals as well as choosing actions (Thagard 2010a, ch. 6) . Figure 17 .5 shows a decision problem which is neutral between two projects, but which could be settled if there were stronger links of support between one project and the various kinds of goals. Normative models for scientific inference (including explanatory coherence, Bayesian probability, and the confirmation theory of the logical positivists) all legislate that the evaluation of hypotheses should be done on the basis of evidence and reasoning alone, with no value component. We should accept theories that fit best with the evidence, and reject the alternatives. In all these schemes there is no room for the social and personal contributions to decision making shown in figure 17.5. Instead, the decision situation is limited to the sparse arrangement mapped in figure 17.6. Since no scientific hypothesis is ever completely verified, in accepting a hypothesis on the basis of evidence, the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis. Obviously, our decision with regard to the evidence and how strong is "strong enough" is going to be a function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Thus, to take a crude but easily manageable example, if the hypothesis under consideration stated that a toxic ingredient of a drug was not present in lethal quantity, then we would require a relatively high degree of confirmation or confidence before accepting the hypothesis-for the consequences of making a mistake here are exceedingly grave by our moral standards. In contrast, if our hypothesis stated that, on the basis of some sample, a certain lot of machine-stamped belt buckles was not defective, the degree of confidence we would require would be relatively lower. How sure we must be before we accept a hypothesis depends on how serious a mistake would be.
Here social goals do not contribute directly to the evaluation of the evidence for and against scientific theories, but do contribute indirectly by setting a threshold for acceptance, making it higher in cases where acceptance might have harmful consequences. Douglas (2009) defends at greater length a similar position. Neither
Rudner nor Douglas proposes the opposite of this harm principle -a benefit principle that would allow hypotheses that would be beneficial if true to be accepted with a lower standard of evidence.
A similar issue arises in the law (Thagard 2006, ch. 9 ). In the British legal system that also operates in the U.S., Canada, and some other countries, people accused of crimes are not supposed to be convicted unless the prosecution shows that they are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In legal discussions, there is no accepted definition of what constitutes a reasonable doubt, but my preferred interpretation is shown in figure 17 .7. In civil trials, decisions are based on a preponderance of evidence, which allows a hypothesis concerning responsibility to be evaluated merely on whether the evidence is maximally coherent with that hypothesis or its negation. In criminal trials, however, there is a presumption that convicting an innocent person is a harm to be avoided, even at the risk of letting a guilty person go. There are other ways in which reasonable doubt might be understood, for example as requiring a higher probability, but problems abound with applying probability theory in legal contexts (Thagard 2004) . As shown in figure   17 .7, the hypotheses that the accused is innocent and that the accused is guilty are both evaluated with respect to how well they explain the evidence presented to the court, but the conclusion of guilt is somewhat inhibited by the connection to the negative value of convicting the innocent. Hence conviction requires stronger evidence than acquittal. Disturbingly, however, the legal analogy seems to break down, because the British legal principles assume that convicting the innocent is a special harm, and does not worry explicitly about the risks associated with acquitting the guilty. In contrast, science seems to lack the asymmetry between accepting a hypothesis that causes harm and not accepting a hypothesis that might bring good.
In some cases, rejecting a hypothesis that is potentially relevant to human needs can also cause harm, for example if a drug is not approved that might have saved lives. Or consider climate change as discussed in chapter 5. Accepting the hypothesis that human behavior is a major cause of climate change has potentially negative consequences if it leads to actions such as reducing climate emissions that limit economic growth and so increase poverty.
However, the status quo may be even more dangerous, if greater carbon emissions contribute to still more global warming, leading to disasters such as drought and flooding.
So where do we end up? Perhaps figure 17.9 portrays the most appropriate values, allowing that social goals can play a small role, subordinate to epistemic goals, in determining what gets accepted and rejected. It is dangerous, however, to allow even a small role for social goals as in figure   17 .9, because it opens the context of evaluation to serious biases . Examination of the ways in which social and personal goals have historically led to severe corruptions of scientific values may shed light on whether the value map in figure 17.9 is indeed the most appropriate one for the context of evaluation.
Biases in Scientific Inference
A defender of the ideal that evaluation of scientific hypotheses should concern only epistemic values can point to many disastrous incursions of the social into the scientific, such as the Nazi rejection of Einstein's relativity theory as Jewish science.
Cognitive science can provide insights into the mental processes by which such biasing occurs, and thereby help to provide guidance about how to encourage people to follow normatively superior practices. however, just about social goals, as it also involved the pursuit of personal goals such as power.
Other instances for quadrant 2 occur in some postmodernist critiques of science where justifiable concern with the mistreatment of people on the basis of their sex, race, promulgate ideas that are not only epistemically dubious but also harmful to those who adopt the ideas. A psychological example is the "Secret" that people can get whatever they want just by wishing for it, an idea that has generated millions of book sales by beguiling people into overestimating the control they have over the universe. Climate change denial of the sort analyzed in chapter 5 also falls into this quadrant, when politicians in the pockets of oil companies distort science in order to pursue policies that in the long run hand hurt human welfare.
All of the cases in quadrants 2-4 arise from the cognitive-affective process of motivated inference that was discussed in chapter 5 concerning climate change. Recall that motivated inference is not just wishful thinking, but leads to more subtle distortions through selective use of evidence, not total abandonment. Social goal or personal goals eclipse epistemic goals without completely eradicating them, except in the most extreme cases where complete nihilism about evidence and reality is advocated. Figure 17 .10
shows the general case where motivated inference allows social and personal values to eclipse epistemic ones, producing the pathologies shown in quadrants 2-4 of table 17.1. Motivated inference is only one of the ways in which emotions can distort thinking; other affective afflictions include self-deception, weakness of will, conflicts of interest, depression, and manic exuberance (Thagard 2007 (Thagard , 2010a . There is an additional affective affliction of great importance that has received surprisingly little attention from psychologists and philosophers: countermotivated inference (Elster 2007) . Countermotivated inference can also occur in scientists and their critics. Science often leads to technologies whose consequences are hard to foresee, such as atomic power, recombinant DNA, and assisted reproduction. Sound science policy requires avoiding motivated inference in which the optimism of technologists sometimes leads them to ignore serious risks, but it also requires avoiding countermotivated inference in which people's ill-informed fears can lead them to be unduly convinced that a technology is dangerous. Examples might include excessive concerns about genetically engineered foods and about the Large Hadron Collider, which some commentators predicted would produce devastating black holes.
The susceptibility of human thinking to motivated and countermotivated inference naturally suggests swinging back to the traditional view that good reasoning should ignore emotion and instead employ normatively correct resources such as formal logic, probability theory, and utility theory. The problem with this reversion is that many important decisions in science and everyday life are hard to analyze using these tools, so that people naturally fall back on emotionally encoded values (Thagard 2006 Another potential use for cognitive-affective maps is to display emotional conceptual changes like those described in Part IV. Someone who begins to appreciate the overwhelming evidence for Darwin's theory may change the valences associated with the concept of evolution and associated concepts. It would be interesting to map emotional conceptual changes that sometimes occur in scientists as well as students.
These may concern concepts specific to particular theories, but also the most general epistemic and social values such as truth and wellbeing.
Conclusion
This chapter has used cognitive-affective maps to illuminate the legitimate and sometimes illegitimate roles that values play in scientific thinking. The maps are not just a diagramming technique, but also an exercise in computational cognitive science: they derive from the HOTCO artificial neural network model of how inferences are made, including ones that can be biased by emotional influences. 
